The methods question in philosophy of education assumes importance because educational problems can be researched from several disciplinary perspectives education being the kind of interdisciplinary area that it is. The aims, ideals and values of education, for example, could be looked into, apart from the philosophical, also from the sociological, historical and psychological angles. The value system of a society can be sociologically described and explained. The goals of an educational system can be studied as they evolve historically. The study of attitudes towards Gandhi an philosophy would essentially be a psychological rather than a philosophical undertaking. The subject of enquiry alone therefore, does not entitle a research to be deemed philosophical. What characterizes philosophical research is the level and depth of critical analysis, the probing into the basic assumptions, concept elucidation, synthesis of views, justification of normative assumptions and prescriptions.

Much of the difficulty in method stems from the undifferentiated conception of educational studies and loosely referring to all miscellaneous talk about education that cannot be classified as belonging to sociology, psychology or any of the other fields of inquiry as philosophy of education. The discourse is sometimes empirical (several studies on philosophy of education have surveys, attitude measurement and other empirical activities as part of their research), and at other times historical. Scholarly pursuit of a field of study is based on respecting the logical and epistemological distinctions that separate the different forms of inquiry-empirical, conceptual, historical, descriptive, experimental-and violation of this ground rule will certainly not enhance the cause of knowledge in any field. This, however, should not be taken to mean that empirical, historical findings are irrelevant to philosophy of education. Far from it. No worthwhile philosophizing about educational issues would ever be possible in the absence of knowledge of relevant empirical findings. The point being made is that the philosopher of education qua philosopher should not put on the robes of a historian or a scientist, although he can peruse knowledge from these fields for his own work as philosopher.

There are as has already been noted, a variety of tasks that are associated with philosophy of education synthetic, analytical, speculative-synoptic, critical-constructive, and normative-evaluative. Historically, however, it came to be interpreted as a system of beliefs on reality, knowledge and value and their `educational implications'. Researches based on the `systems' model have taken the form of searching for articulated `isms' in an educational thinker or system, for example pragmatism in Gandhi's educational thoughts or naturalism in Tagore or idealistic trends in Vedic education. The research subject is approached here within the framework of a philosophical school. Alternatively, a particular philosophical system-Buddhism, Gita, Upanishads, Sankhya, Jainism has been explored for its educational principles and prescriptions.

Progress in philosophical thought inspired by a variety of factors have projected to the forefront a view of philosophy that puts its analytical-critical function at the centre. Philosophy of education on this view is the activity of analysis, clarification and criticism exercised on the concepts, statements and theories of education. The analytical movement has been one of the most in- fluential in the history of philosophy and it represents the contemporary spirit in both philosophy and philosophy of education, It will not be out of place here, therefore, to explain the approach in some detail.

The analytical philosopher of education, to start with, accepts and respects the epistemological distinctions that characterize different forms of inquiry-empirical, a priori, normative. He then clearly demar-

RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION-A TREND REPORT 51

cates the logical and conceptual issues relating to the subject of his study which alone are his concern qua philosopher. This can be illustrated with reference to an educational issue of great contemporary relevance, viz., equality of educational opportunity. This problem can be studied from various stand points-historical, sociological, economic, psychological-as, in fact, it has. Now what does philosophical research into such a downto-earth problem mean? Obviously, it does not mean accumulation of factual data bearing on the problem (although this does not mean, as has already been ob- served, that the philosopher of education can afford to be ignorant of empirical findings from these fields). On the contrary, what it means is that he addresses himself to certain basic questions pertaining to the subject which clearly fall outside the purview of observational and experimental methods. What then, are these questions?

First, there are conceptual issues to be clarified. `Equality of educational opportunity' is a notoriously vague and complex concept. Empirical knowledge in this field cannot even begin unless the logical and conceptual issues like What do equality and equality of op- portunity mean and What constitutes an "equal educational opportunity" T, are first analysed and clarified. It is the task of philosophical research to make explicit the hidden dimensions of this concept and their logical implications.

Secondly, equality of educational opportunity like most other educational problems is largely a normative problem. Judgements on it, therefore, necessarily involve value assertions and discussions on it are often hortatory. These cannot be settled by appealing to em- pirical considerations alone. They need the rigour of philosophical inquiry. Further, a rational justification as to why equality of educational opportunity should be accepted as a value or an excellence, should come from philosophy.

Finally, the ideal of equality of educational opportunity has given rise to a number of controversies regarding the several aspects of our education like meritbased admissions, the common school system, nurturing of talent in special institutions, the institution of Navodaya Vidyalayas, reservations and quotas in institutions of higher learning, affirmative action and compensatory education programmes, to cite only a few. Many of these controversies derive their- force, partly at least, from a lack of conceptual clarity. The `analytic guillotine' helps us to see our way clearly through these controversies and this is an essential first step in their resolution. It is also the task of research to identify the point of the controversy, to examine the different points of view and the arguments advanced in support (or against) them, to test for conceptual confu- sion and fallacies in reasoning, to make an appraisal of programmes and practices with reference to how well they satisfy the criteria of equality of educational opportunity and to work out a reconciliation and synthesis.

Granting then that there are distinctly philosophical questions in education-logical and conceptual, normative and speculative-how does one go about one's task? What, in other words, are the different tasks involved in doing philosophy and how are these to be performed? The import of these questions is not to call for the complete description of a `method', arranged in a logical and operational sequence. Such a rule-of-thumb method, frankly, does not exist. Nor would it be desirable, philosophically, to be prescriptive and deterministic in these matters. Nevertheless, examination of the work of philosophers of education, especially those whose work is based on the analysis of `ordinary language' does indicate the existence of distinct ways of thinking and tackling problems: analysis of concepts, appraisal of arguments, validation of theories. One may discover in this the hazy contours of a `method' for those who wish to embark upon research in this field. As the burden of this presentation is to dispel the notion that philosophy of education research has no guidelines or a rigorous method, an attempt has been made here to make explicit the mechanics of this method in terms of operations and tasks involved while dealing with different aspects of education.

The Mechanics of Concept Analysis

        
        Aspect                             Tasks
        
        I.   Elucidation of con- Isolating the conceptual from fact, value,
             cepts                moral opinion.  Examination of the meanings
                                 of words with reference to vagueness,
                                 ambiguity, emotive overtones.
        
                                 Formulation of the defining characteristics
                                 of the concept by identifying the logically
                                 necessary conditions to the extent possible 
                                 by-
         
                                 -supplying the context,
         
                                 -appealing to the standard example,
                                 -searching for the paradigm case, and
                                 -searching for counter-examples, contrary 
                                 cases.
        
                                 Mapping the boundaries of the concept by-
        
                                          

52 C. SESHADRI

        
                                 -creation of imaginative cases,
                                 -invented cases,
                                 -suppositions cases, and
                                 -counter-factual instances
        
        II.  Appraisal of educa  -Study of the logical grammar of the sen-
             tional statements   tences to determine their logical status
             and arguments       (whether they assert propositions or are
                                 imperatives, value judgements or emo-
                                 tive expressions).
                  
                                 Analysis of educational slogans and met-
                                 aphors, appraisal of educational argu-
                                 ments and resolution of controversies-
                                 identifying  the  point(s)  of  the
                                 controversy, checking for conceptual
                                 confusion, fallacies of reasoning, formal
                                 validity of inferences.
        
        III. Justification of    Justification in terms of values, appeal
             educational pre-    to reason, formal requirements of 
             scriptions &        consistency.
             preferences
        
        IV.  Validation of       Elucidation of concepts involved.  Exam-
             educational         ination of the assumptions of the theory. 
             theories            Are they sound?  Are they testable or met-
                                 aphysical?  Are they morally acceptable?
        
                                 Justification of the prescriptive conclusions
                                 of the theory in terms of the assumptions.
                                 Consistency of arguments, internal coherence 
                                 of prescriptions.
        
                                          

It is certainly not the intention of the above presentation to strait- jacket philosophy of education into an arbitrarily delimited method within the boundaries of linguistic analysis. Nor is it the intention to suggest that philosophy of education conceived in any other way cannot give specific methodological directions. As has been repeatedly emphasized throughout this presentation, philosophy of education is systematic, disciplined inquiry, whatever its mode, analytic or synthetic. The choice between different interpretations of philosophy is certainly not a choice between rigor and no rigor. If the case for the analytical view of philosophy of education has been forcefully presented here it is for the simple reason that research output in this area is woefully lacking in high quality critical analytical studies. Several reviewers of research have in one voice argued for the adoption of `sophisticated methodologies in terms of logic, linguistic analysis and criticism' (Adaval 1968, Premnath 1968, Manual 1979, Buch 1986). Furthermore, analysis is not alien to Indian philosophical tradition. A host of areas in Indian education are crying out for philosophical enlightenment (these have been set out elsewhere) and the sooner the challenge is accepted the better it would be for the development of clear and informed thinking on issues of educational policy and practice.

SOCIAL RELEVANCE AND USEFULNESS OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Of what significance can philosophical research in education be to the educational practitioner and theoretician? What, in other words, is the use of a philosophy of education? It cannot be denied that philosophical research should justify itself, apart from its intrinsic worth as an intellectual excellence to be pursued for its own sake, also by its practical utility to the educational policy maker and practitioner. That philosophy of education can be useful in this sense also can be argued. In the first place, policy decisions on education, by the very nature of the enterprise cannot be based solely on the factual findings of the concerned empirical fields of investigation like psychology, sociology and management sciences. They. also need philosophical inputs to make explicit the whole range and depth of the meaning of the issue at stake, its ramifications and logical implications, to clarify the kinds of decisions that have to be faced in dealing with them. One would also look to philosophy to deal with value disputes in educational issues and also for rational justification of the goal, ideal or value being pursued. Further, to deal effectively with educational controversies, one needs the philosophical temperament and rigor of thought to lay bare conceptual confusions, hidden assumptions and fallacies of reasoning.

If philosophy of education is to perform its instrumental function effectively, research endeavor should be directed primarily on those problems of educational policy and practice as are of `here and now' concern. The Indian educational scene today is characterized with dissensions and debates raging around issue like national goals of education, democratization of education, issues of curriculum, new educational technologies, and covering all stages and sectors of education pre-school, primary, secondary, higher, technical and professional. But, going by the researches conducted thus far, philosophy of education appears to be deeply obsessed with the past and have very little to do with ongoing happenings. One gets the feeling that only events and personalities deep in the past are worthy of philosophical pursuit. If the objects of philosophical inquiry are limited to ancient lore alone, philosophy to that extent moves away from living reality, weakens its link with emerging policy concerns and becomes just an academic exercise. Of course, one can justify such research on the ground of searching in history for insights which

RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION-A TREND REPORT 53

may help in the understanding of the present and, possibly, its betterment. When carried out in that spirit, research into the past certainly can fulfil one of its important purposes. But this is not to say that one should look for enlightenment to the past alone, taking what `was' as a reservoir of such wisdom. The point is that philosophy of education research will have functional value only when its concerns emerge from events and problems that are experienced here and now. It is in this context that thematic and problem oriented type of research studies acquire great significance. Sadly, there have not been enough of them.

This need not come as a surprise. In a way, the state of researches in philosophy of education reflects the state of its parent discipline, philosophy. General philosophy has also come under fire for its lack of direction, social relevance and originality, a situation that is paradoxical considering our very rich philosophical legacy. This, however, can be no consolation for philosophy of education. The point of drawing this comparison is to reiterate that philosophy of education, being a branch of applied philosophy, gets its sustenance also from general philosophy. Unfortunately, there has been very little communication between philosophers and educationists and philosophy of education remains deprived of the nourishment that it should, under more favorable circumstances, get from such interaction. The absence of interest on the part of philosophers in the problems of education appears odd, considering the vitality of current educational debate in the wake of recent developments like the announcement of a new National Policy of Education, the appointment of the National Commissions on Teachers, the publication of the discussion document, Challenge of Education (1985), to cite only a few. Again, discussions currently going on value-orientation of education, university autonomy and academic freedom and such other issues have not involved philosophers to the extent one would wish. Understandably, therefore, philosophy of education has not emerged as a vibrant, intellectual activity.

The Indianization Question

In the context of the general demand for social relevance, there is a cry from many quarters for the Indianization of courses and curricula. It has been pointed out that much of what is taught (and, as a corollary, researched) derives its inspiration and has its basis in borrowed Western models of thinking. The relevance of such knowledge and modes of thinking to the understanding of issues in Indian education, arising in a unique socio-philosophic-cultural context is not in any case apparent. The Programme of Action (1986) has observed that there is too much emphasis in textbooks on Western ideas and teachers under training do not get exposed adequately to Indian philosophical and psychological concepts of education.

All this may be true. But the demand for Indianization has to be carefully understood and assessed if its genuine intentions are to be realized. In the first place, one has to think of how far one can stretch the meaning of `Indianization'. Indian philosophical thinking enjoys a distinctiveness with its emphasis on reason, intuition, analytical and synthetic thinking. Definitely these should inform the approaches to the understanding of Indian educational issues. At the same time, Indianization should not be taken to mean refusal to take due note of recent developments in the area of philosophy of education elsewhere solely on the basis of philosophical prejudices. Such a stance would be narrow and chauvinistic. Different socio-cultural contexts bring different educational problems and issues into focus and in different intensities. Indianization should be manifested in the kind of the distinctly Indian concerns that it deals with and not in the refusal to adopt this or that approach solely because the approach is not of Indian origin.

Researches conducted thus far have, of course, concerned themselves with distinctively Indian issues, the study of the educational philosophy of Indian thinkers and Indian systems of education, Indian scriptures and religious systems. Some of these are set in a comparative framework, generally with a model from the English speaking West-Gandhi and Dewey, Tagore and Whitehead, for example. There are also researches whose exclusive focus is on individual Western thinkers like Russell, Read or Kilpatrick. More popular, however, are researches which have adopted the framework of Western philosophical schools like Pragmatism, Existentialism or Idealism, These researches have attempted to understand the educational thought of Indian educationists and educational systems with the help of philosophical theories on reality, knowledge and value associated with the different isms'. It would be interesting to explore these very educational themes and systems from the point of view of Indian philosophical thinking