NOTE OF DISSENT BY SHRI S.R. DAS
While I am in general agreement with most of the recommendations made in the foregoing report and with much of the reasonings in support there of I find some difficulty in subscribing to some of those recommendations and the reasons on which the same are founded. I do not, however, desire to press all my objections but am content to record my dissent only on such of those recommendations as I consider to be vital.
A. Authorities of the University-their Powers and Constitution In olden times the universities were of an affiliating type doing no more than prescribing syllabi and holding examinations for students in affiliated colleges. In those days there was no provision for any Academic Council. But gradually even these universities in course of time developed postgraduate teaching departments and research centres. Although some of the modern universities are also of an affiliating type, they all have a teaching and research side also. Teaching and research being thus the principal feature of all universities an Academic Council became a necessary body in the university. Thus in modern times there are three main "authorities" in the universities, namely, (a) the Academic Council, (b) the Executive Council (Syndicate), and (c) the Court (Senate). I entirely agree that it is necessary clearly to demarcate the functions of these three bodies, making each authoritative in its own sphere.
The Academic Council obviously should be the academic authority in the university and should have the control and general regulation of the academic activities of the university. It must have the right to advise the Executive Council (Syndicate) and the Court (Senate) on all academic matters and correspondingly it should be responsible for determining the contents of the courses and the standards of examinations. There can be no two opinions that there should be no dictation from outside to a university as to what its standard should be or what the contents of its courses should be, apart from the statutory power of the University Grants Commission in this respect. It is of the utmost importance that this power of the Academic Council to regulate all academic matters of the university should be carefully preserved and safeguarded and it is this freedom from outside interference in academic affairs which indicates the measure of the autonomy of the university. It follows from this that the Academic Council of a university should be com-composed mostly of academic people, internal as well as external. The Vice-Chancellor, the Pro- Vice-Chancellor, the Treasurer/Finance Officer and the Proctor/Dean of students should be members of the Academic Council. The Vice- Chancellor should be the Chairman of this Council.
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The Executive Council (Syndicate) is the Executive Body of the university. It should have the power to hold, control and administer the property and funds of the university, to appoint officers (other than the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and Pro-Vice- Chancellor), teachers and other servants of the university and to define their duties and the conditions of their services, but not so as to alter the number, qualifications and status of teachers otherwise than on the recommendation of the Academic Council. The Executive Council should also have power to accept donations and gifts in money or in kind, to appoint examiners after consideration of the recommendation of the Academic Council, to arrange for the holding of all the university examinations and publishing the results thereof. It should be the duty of the Executive Council (Syndicate) to prepare the annual budget of the university and to be the custodian of the common seal of the university. The Vice-Chancellor must be the Chairman of the Executive Council.
My learned colleagues propose that the Executive Council (Syndi- cate) shall be composed of 17 members as therein enumerated. Their proposal is that out of the 17 members 4 shall be Deans, 4 shall be Principals of colleges and 3 should be elected by the Court (Senate) out of their own members. A cursory glance at the composition of the Court (Senate) as recommended by them will show that these three members elected by the Court (Senate) will be teachers of the university, for the teachers predominate in the Court (Senate). Thus 11 out of 17 members are likely, if not necessarily, to be teachers of the university. The recommendation thus formulated clearly means that the Executive Council (Syndicate) should be a body in which the teachers employed in the university should have a clear majority. I am unable to subscribe to this view.
The Court (Senate) has been described in many university Acts as the supreme governing body. Chapter IV of the Report sets forth the powers and duties to be conferred on the Court (Senate). If in addition to those powers and duties further authority is conferred on the Court (Senate) e.g., to make statutes, to consider the ordinances and regulations, to pass resolutions on the annual report and to review the acts of the Executive Council and the Academic Council, then such conferment of additional powers may well act as a deterant against arbitrary exercise of powers by the two last mentioned bodies. Usually the Court (Senate) meets once a year and the little experience I have in University matters shows that there is, in actual practice, no danger of such power being abused by the Court (Senate). The composition of the Court (Senate) as set forth in Chapter IV of the Report appears to me to give such undue weightage to the teachers of the university as is calculated to be detrimental to what I conceive to be the best interests of the university.
The function of the teachers of a university should primarily be to teach the students and to do research work on their own or to supervise and guide the research work of the students. The freedom to do this primary
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duty will, to my mind, be amply protected by academic functions being definitely assigned exclusively to the Academic Council and by including in its constitution a very large preponderance of internal academic persons and by adequate representation of the teachers of the university in its Executive Council (Syndicate) as well as in its Court (Senate). If in addition to the duty of teaching and carrying on and assisting research work the teachers are to perform administrative duties and exercise secular, as opposed to academic, functions by forming a majority in the Executive Council (Syndicate) and the Court (Senate) as recommended by my learned colleagues, then I apprehend that there will be a scramble for power leading to formation of powerful groups amongst the teachers. The result of such a situation is bound to bring about a deterioration in the academic atmosphere and lead to unhealthy power politics in the academic life of the university. In such a situation no Vice-Chancellor will be able to function properly unless he be himself the leader of dominant faction of the teachers or subservient to that faction and the university will lose the benefit of the knowledge and experience which non-academic persons usually contribute to the proper administration of the university. It will, to my mind, be disastrous to the best interest of the university to divert the attention of the teachers from their elementary and primary duty of teaching and doing Pr guiding research work.
The following paragraphs from the Report of the Robbin's Committee on Higher Education appear to me to be in point:
"665. Moreover we believe past experience to show that the Universities have benefitted greatly from the initiative and wisdom of lay members on their. governing bodies. Where men and women of wide experience and high standing in the world of affairs can spare time to associate themselves with university activities, the universities gain from the partnership strength and sagacity in their dealings with the outside world. And, even where academic affairs are concerned, lay arbitra- tion is a valuable resource in case of conflict. We are sure that teachers have an important contribution to make to the discussion of the non-academic affairs of their institution and we are therefore much in favour of their adequate representation on ultimate governing bodies. But we are in agreement with the principle of a majority of lay members of the Court or the Council.
666. Having said this, however, we must at once add that the mixed system we favour only works where it is run with good sense and moderation. A governing body with a lay majority is justifiable only when it recognises a proper division of labour between itself and the Senate, or whatever the academic governing body is called. Its function is to bring outside
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wisdom to bear on the external relations of the university and the evolution of its general policy, and to act as arbiter on matters that cannot be resolved by the academic staff. It is no part of its function to interfere in the business of internal academic Organisation, still less in matters of syllabuses and curricula. The situation is likely to become intolerable if such attempts are made. We are confident that, in general, the governing bodies of universities in Great Britain observe the necessary distinctions, though the equilibrium must always be delicate and cases of infringement may occasionally occur."
I strongly feel that the above obseravtions, with which I most respectfully agree, embody very sound principles which should be applied to Indian universities with regard to the constitution of both the Court (Senate) and the Executive Council (Syndicate). If the Governing Bodies of universities in Great Britain observe the necessary distinction between academic and non-academic functions, I see no reason why such convention should not grow in Indian universities. I am strengthened in my belief by the fact that in my experience as Vice-Chancellor of Visva-Bharati University for over five years I have not come across a single instance in which the Court (Senate) or the Executive Council (Syndicate) of that University has over-riden any proposal or recommendation of the Academic Council. To put a majority of teachers in the Executive Council (Syndicate) and/or in the Court (Senate) will eliminate all prospect of the growth of any healthy convention which is contemplated by the Robbin's Committee Report, If there be any theoretical possibility or apprehension of the Court (Senate) or the Executive Council (Syndicate) over-riding the Academic Council suitable safeguards may easily be inserted in the University Act or in the Statutes made thereunder by clearly defining the nature, scope and details of the powers and functions of the three authorities and by expressly providing that in case of disagreement between the Academic Council on the one hand and either of the other two bodies on the other hand the matter in dispute should be referred to and the dealt with by Visitor.
In view of the foregoing observations I recommand that the three authorities should be composed on the following lines:
(a) Academic Council 1. Ex-Officio Members
i) Vice-Chancellor; ii) Pro Vice-Chancellor; iii) All Deans of Faculties; iv) All Heads of academic departments; v) Principals of affiliated colleges; vi) Heads of Departments of affiliated colleges; vii) Proctor/Dean of students; viii) Librarian;
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2. Other Members:
i) Seven teachers of the University other than those mentioned in clause I (iii) & (iv) of which at least two shall be from women teachers;
ii) Five teachers of affiliated colleges other than those in clause I (v) & (vi) of whom at least one shall be from woman teacher;
iii) Five persons not connected with the University to be co-opted for their specialised knowledge.
(b) The Executive Council (Syndicate)
i) Vice-Chancellor 1 ii) Pro-Vice-Chancellor 1 iii) Treasurer/Finance Officer 1 iv) Proctor/Dean of Students 1 v) Deans of Faculties 2 vi) Principals of Colleges 2 vii) Members of the Court elected by the Court at its Annual meeting 2 viii) Members nominated by the Visitor 2 ix) Member nominated by the Chancellor 1 x) Members elected by the alumni Association from among its own members 2
(c) The Court(Senate) 1. Ex-Officio Members 10 i) Chancellor 1 ii) Vice-Chancellor 1 iii) Pro-Vice-Chancellor 1 iv) Treasurer/Finance Officer 1 v) Deans of Faculties (not more than 6
2. Other Members 90
i) Representatives of the Alumni Association 5 ii) Representatives of Donors 5 iii) Representatives of Academic Council 5 iv) Nominees of the Executive Council from outside the University 5 v) Nominees of the Visitor 10 vi) Nominees of the Chancellor 2
vii) Representatives of learned professions, industries, commerce etc., management of private colleges, if any 18
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viii) Teachers representing the University Departments and colleges including the Librarian, Proctor/Deans of students, other than Deans of Faculties preferably by rotation, out of whom at least five shall be women 30
ix) Members co-opted by the Court. 10
B. The Vice-Chancellor-the Duration of His Term-His Age Limit I respectfully agree with the view that the responsibility for the selection of the Vice-Chancellor should be squarely placed either on the University or on the Visitor/Government. The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor has been recommended by my learned colleagues to be for a period of five years with eligibility for re-appointment for another term of five years. However careful the authority selecting the Vice-Chancellor may be, there will always remain a risk of a wrong choice. In case a wrong choice is found to have been made, it will be a heavy load to carry that incumbent for five years. It is conceded that a period less than five years is not sufficient to enable a Vice- Chancellor to show concrete, good results of his administration, but it is expected that he may at least show signs of promise of good administration in a shorter period of time. I, therefore, commend for consideration the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor initially for a period of three years, and in case he shows good promise, his term may be extended by another three years and if within these six years he shows some concrete results then he may be given a third term of three years. This will ensure that a really good Vice-Chancellor will have nine years to run the administration.
The general longevity in India has gone up. I am not in favour of fixing a rigid age limit for the appointment or re-appointment of a Vice-Chancellor. Even at the risk of being misunderstood I venture to point out that if an age limit of 65 years be fixed for the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor, all retired judges of the Supreme Court in India would be debarred from becoming a Vice-Chancellor, however physically fit and mentally alert he may be. I may also point out that some of the Vice-Chancellors in universities in the South and North of India who have made their mark as Vice-Chancellors and added lustre to the universities placed tinder their charge would have been disqualified from becoming Vice-Chancellors if there had been such an age limit. There are known instances of brilliant Education Ministers at the Centre and in the States who became Ministers when they had crossed the age limit of 65 years. Moreover now that the proposal for appointment of a Pro Vice-Chancellor has been accepted in order to give relief to the Vice-Chancellor from the burden of routine duties, the fixing of an age limit appears to me to be rather otiose.
Except as hereinbefore stated and subject to the foregoing observations on the points therein dealt with I respectfully agree, generally speaking, with the recommendations set forth in the foregoing report.